In 2025 and 26, what we've been seeing is a very unusual spectre of land-based conflicts being projected onto the maritime domain and this has come with very unprecedented intensity and alarming reach. You have the Black Sea, a conflict zone in the Russian-Ukraine war. It has been described as the world's most dangerous in the world. More than 570 vessels have been attacked this year. At least 30 seafarers have died in the Black Sea— more than the casualties in the Strait of Hormuz and the Persian Gulf. 

Both Russia and Ukraine have been targeting each other's shipping and ports to basically cut each other’s export lifelines—grain, diesel and oil. War-risk insurance premiums are skyrocketing, something like 15% of the value of a ship in some places. Exports from these two countries have collapsed or are being re-routed at great cost.

This is economic warfare of a kind that we've not seen post the Second World War. And we have seen several multilateral initiatives at play recently. There was one in Abu Dhabi to try and resolve this war because until you solve the problems on land, the spillover into the sea will continue.

The Red Sea and the Bab-el-Mandab and the Straits of Hormuz, of course, are active conflict theatres. When I was growing up, my favourite Tintin comic used to be the Red Sea Sharks. And that is something that we're seeing in real time.

It began in 2023 with a seizure of a ship called the Galaxy Leader. And I was talking to some of my Marine Commando friends and they were astonished by how supposed non-state actors like the Houthis were able to execute a heliborne vessel boarding and seizure with such precision. 

Then you have the Caspian Sea as a conflict theatre because that is the maritime corridor between Iran and the Russian Federation. The Caspian Sea has been attacked by Israel. The United States has Operation Iron Gate operation to sever these links between Russia and Iran. And Ukraine too, interestingly, a few months back, struck at Iranian vessels in the Caspian Sea where we briefly saw the intersection of these two ongoing conflicts. And then you have, of course, the traditional South China Sea and the Taiwan Straits where the ‘peaceful rise of China’ is in full evidence for the rest of the world.

They have militarised islands in the South China Sea, something like 12, 13 square kilometres have been reclaimed. China has disregarded UNCLOS Awards of 2016 favouring the Philippines and they continue to exercise grey zone tactics at countries in and around the South China Sea. Of course, the Taiwan Straits is almost an active conflict theatre, China is holding military drills there with increasing and alarming frequency. And these drills are believed to be preparations for an eventual seaborne invasion of Taiwan.

So, I would argue that what we're seeing today, all these maritime conflicts, this is possibly the first time in the 81 years since the end of the Second World War that we are witnessing multiple conflicts at sea. And this is very worrisome.

And I don't believe the existing measures; the existing conventions are enough to tackle these because it's simply unprecedented. It's like a black swan event. There are multiple black swan events, you know, playing out on the oceans.

And while we're talking of us living in the post post-Cold War world, the uncertainties of today, we are also living in the post-UNCLOS world of post-1994, where with these kind of maritime conflicts being played out with complete disregard for the safety of mariners and, of course, the vessels. 

And the mechanics of this spillover—you have chokepoint warfare where we have seen possibly for the first time in history where one country, Iran, has been able to dominate either directly or indirectly through its proxies, three of the world's eight choke points.

Now Iran, literally a country that has no Navy to speak of, barely an Air Force, has been able to exercise control over the entire Arabian Peninsula. This has never happened in history. 

The targeting of commercial vessels, of course, I mentioned this case of the container ship that had been captured, the Galaxy Leader that had been captured by the Houthis, but there's also a very interesting instance of the MV Chem Pluto. It's a chemical tanker that was attacked about 100 nautical miles off the coast of India, off Gujarat in 2023, 23rd of December, 2020. And what struck me was how this vessel that was so close to Indian territorial waters was hit by a Shahed drone, fired thousands of kilometres away by unknown actors, possibly came from Iran or it came from the Houthis, but it was struck with such precision just above the steering compartment, the aft steering compartment, and that led me to think that if you have a non-state actor with the ability to do this kind of thing, what would a state actor do to radars of our frontline warships far out at sea? 

So, these conflicts are redefining the way maritime conflicts are being fought.

You have, of course, the proxy and hybrid actors that I spoke of, the training that went into capturing ships like the Galaxy Leader. And there's another dynamic at play here, which is interconnectivity. Now, all the supply chains that were set up because of the globalised world post the Cold War in 1991, the effects of this interconnectivity are being felt in 2025 and 2026.

Because what happens in one theatre, one conflict area, one scene, has ripples across the pond, across other parts of the world, where you're feeling these pain points now in 2026 because of that globalised world. 

And one of the biggest enablers of all of these grey zone operations has been technology. Now, in the post-Cold War world, which is essentially post-1991, we needed a lot of investments in submarines, in long range maritime patrol aircraft, missile boats and such to be able to effect sea- denial operations.

But now what we're seeing is, because of the proliferation of drones, low-cost ballistic missiles, non-state actors, even state actors have the ability to project power far out at sea. The Iranians have struck somewhere in the vicinity of Diego Garcia; that's 3,000 kilometres deep into the Indian Ocean. The Houthis have been doing that on a regular basis.

So there is a merit in the fact that this concepts like precision mass are now playing out in the maritime theatre as well. And the fort, as they say, has become as powerful, if not more powerful than the fleet. And navies all over the world are having to rework their battle precis to build bigger warships with larger magazines and reload capacity.

And like I said, this is the first time since the Second World War that we've had land conflicts spilling out into the Indian Ocean. And multiple maritime conflicts at play. And I must mention here that during Operation Sindoor, a lot of people did ask why the Indian Navy was not deployed in conflict.

And I believe it had to do with the fact that the decision makers took a very conscious call on not engaging the Indian Navy because that would indicate a level of escalation beyond just responding to a terror attack. It would cross the threshold into economic warfare. Now the Indian Navy, of course, is no stranger to economic warfare.

When at war, the Indian Navy has waged economic war very effectively. In 1971. I've written a book on that. Ambassador Parthasarathy has written the foreword for that, Operation X. But here this time around, the Navy was restrained because they were not fighting a full-on conflict.

And that is one of the reasons why it was held back from attacking Pakistan's maritime infrastructure. This is a contested decision. I mean, these debates on this will continue why we didn't escalate beyond a point. But I think the government was very wise in calling off the operations as they did on the 10th of May. Because when navies are engaged, it is an unprecedented level of escalation.

Now, as I mentioned, these current ongoing conflicts have been straining UNCLOS, the organisations like the IMO, Regional codes of conduct. They've been raising insurance rates. Indian seafarers are at risk. And this is a point that I'd mentioned about three years back when the attack on the Chem Pluto took place, with the Indians account for 12 % of the global seafaring community.

There's something like more than a quarter of a million Indians out at sea. So we are in the firing line, whether we like it or not. And it is in our interest to play a greater role in mediating these conflicts, ensuring that this rules-based maritime order, which is under threat today, which faces a crisis of credibility and enforcement, that needs to be handled on a war footing.

And of course, there is the risk of further escalation or the fact that episodes like this are localised rather than continuous and universal. So, it is important for us to ensure that these kinds of maritime conflicts don't spread, they don't become the new normal. And we have to look at ways which adaptive, unilateral coalitions possibly targeted maritime initiatives.

One of the distinguished panellists earlier was mentioning something like a United Nations peacekeeping force for the sea, which Admiral Chauhan said is out of the question, but there are out-of-the-box solutions that we need to look at to ensure that there is safety of life at sea. Because like I said, our organisations, our institutions are not being set up for conflicts of this kind, where five years back we were being told that wars of attrition are a thing of the past. We would never fight wars like the First World War or the Second World War.

And we have the Russia-Ukraine war that's going to be entering its fifth year just three months from now. And on the ground, like I say, it's the First World War. In the air, with the drones that they're shooting at each other, it's like Hitler’s V1 and V2 blitz against the UK in the final year of the Second World War.

And my last point, sir, would be that we have to ensure that this balance between de-escalation and deterrence is there to prevent this spectre of land warfare and this end of war of attrition permanently militarising the oceans on which we all depend on for our sustenance. Thank you. 

--from a speech delivered at the Annual Conference 2026 of the Society for Indian Ocean Studies (SIOS), held on November 13 at the India International Centre (IIC) in New Delhi.

Sandeep Unnithan

Veteran journalist with 30+ years in media, Sandeep Unnithan is a national security expert and author of two acclaimed books, including Black Tornado, adapted into the web series State of Siege.