Lt Gen A.B. Shivane’s recent article, US-China-Russia Great Power Rivalry and India’s Balancing Act, provides a thoughtful assessment of India’s position amid intensifying competition between Washington, Beijing and Moscow. His central proposition that strategic autonomy is neither neutrality nor equidistance, but the preservation of sovereign decision-making through national capability is compelling and timely.

The larger question, however, is whether India should continue defining itself primarily as a balancing power between competing great powers, or prepare to become one of the powers around which the international system increasingly balances.

That distinction marks the transition from strategic autonomy to strategic consequence.

Beyond the Great-Power Triangle

The US-China-Russia triangle remains a major driver of contemporary geopolitics. Their competition influences military alliances, technology controls, financial systems, energy markets and global supply chains. Yet viewing the emerging order primarily through this triangular lens risks overlooking the redistribution of strategic agency across Eurasia, the Indo-Pacific and West Asia.

As I argued in West Asia Conflict: Beyond the Myth of US Global Dominance, the international system can no longer be understood principally through the actions of one hegemon, or even a handful of great powers. Regional powers increasingly possess sufficient economic, technological and military capabilities to pursue independent strategic choices.

Saudi Arabia and the UAE are diversifying relationships rather than accepting exclusive alignments. Iran remains consequential despite sustained pressure. Israel exercises considerable technological and military influence. Turkey pursues an increasingly autonomous geopolitical agenda. Japan, France and the European Union retain significant strategic agency.

Rather than a rigid triangle, the emerging order increasingly resembles a networked multipolar system, where countries cooperate through overlapping arrangements without necessarily joining permanent blocs.

India exemplifies this phenomenon. It participates simultaneously in the Quad, BRICS, SCO and I2U2 while maintaining important relationships with the United States, Russia, France, Japan, Israel, Iran and the Gulf states.

The objective is not to remain equidistant from everyone. It is to remain independent in choosing everyone.

Strategic Autonomy Is Freedom to Choose

Strategic autonomy was historically associated with non-alignment. Contemporary autonomy rests on different foundations.

A country cannot claim meaningful strategic autonomy if its defence capability depends excessively upon external suppliers, its technological ecosystem remains vulnerable, its energy security can be disrupted through distant maritime chokepoints, or critical supply chains remain externally exposed.

Diplomatic independence must therefore be sustained by national capability. Economic resilience, technological depth, military preparedness, maritime security, industrial capacity and institutional strength collectively determine whether foreign policy remains genuinely sovereign.

But strategic autonomy should not become synonymous with perpetual hedging. Keeping options open matters only when those options translate into influence.

India can cooperate deeply with the United States on technology and Indo-Pacific security, France on defence, Japan on infrastructure, Israel on technology, the Gulf on investment and connectivity, Russia on energy and Eurasia, and Iran on continental access without adopting the geopolitical worldview of any single partner.

Strategic autonomy should therefore mean freedom to choose, not reluctance to choose.

This is no longer classical non-alignment. It is multi-vector, issue-based strategic alignment.

India already possesses many attributes of a major power: economic scale, nuclear deterrence, a substantial military, technological capabilities, demographic weight, a sophisticated space programme and geographic centrality in the Indian Ocean.

But possessing power and converting power into consequence are different.

As argued in India at the Inflection Point: From Strategic Power to Strategic Consequence, India’s challenge increasingly lies not in the absence of resources or geopolitical opportunity but in its ability to integrate them into coherent national power.

Technology must connect with defence innovation; defence innovation with industrial production; industrial production with finance, scale and exports. Maritime capability must reinforce energy security and trade connectivity, while diplomacy must be supported by durable economic, technological and security relationships.

The strategic competition of the coming decades will consequently not simply be between armies or economies. It will increasingly be between national systems capable of integrating technology, capital, manufacturing, military capability, logistics and diplomacy into coherent strategic ecosystems.

That is where strategic autonomy acquires substance.

An Interconnected Strategic Geography

India’s western strategic environment demonstrates why traditional geopolitical compartments are increasingly inadequate.

West Asia, Iran, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Central Asia and the Indian Ocean are generally considered separate theatres. In reality, developments across them increasingly interact.

Instability in the Gulf affects energy markets. Disruption at the Strait of Hormuz directly affects India’s energy security. Iran influences connectivity towards Afghanistan and Central Asia through Chabahar. Afghanistan affects Pakistan’s western frontier. Pakistan remains inseparable from China’s continental and maritime strategy. The Arabian Sea connects these theatres directly to India.

This interconnected geography constitutes what I have described as a Western Strategic Continuum.

A crisis at Hormuz is therefore not merely a Middle Eastern crisis; it rapidly becomes an Indian economic-security issue. Instability in Afghanistan affects terrorism and continental connectivity. Maritime insecurity in the Red Sea affects freight costs, supply chains and India’s trade with Europe.

Indian strategy increasingly requires systems thinking rather than geographically isolated policymaking.

Shivane rightly highlights the consequences of the growing Russia-China relationship. Western pressure has undoubtedly pushed Moscow closer towards Beijing economically and strategically. But India should not assume this process is inevitable or irreversible.

Russia possesses its own strategic traditions and geopolitical interests across Eurasia. India has a legitimate interest in preserving strategic plurality across the continent rather than allowing overwhelming Chinese influence to emerge.

This does not mean choosing Moscow over Washington, nor does it reflect nostalgia for Cold War relationships. It reflects a straightforward strategic calculation:

A strategically autonomous Russia serves Indian interests better than a Russia overwhelmingly dependent upon China.

Likewise, expanding India-US cooperation need not produce alliance dependency. The United States remains an indispensable partner in technology, investment, maritime security and defence. But mature strategic partnerships must accommodate differences.

India should be able to cooperate closely with Washington while differing over Russia, Iran, trade or other issues whenever Indian interests require it.

That freedom is the essence of strategic autonomy.

From Balancing to Strategic Gravity

There is nevertheless a limit to defining India through its ability to balance other powers.

Traditional balance-of-power thinking asks how India should respond to decisions made in Washington, Beijing or Moscow. A more ambitious Indian strategy should increasingly ask how those capitals respond to decisions made in New Delhi.

This is where Strategic Gravity becomes important.

Traditional power often attempts to compel behaviour. Strategic gravity attracts partnerships.

Countries gravitate towards states that provide markets, investment, technology, connectivity, defence capability, political stability and institutional credibility.

India’s enormous domestic market, technological ecosystem, digital capabilities, pharmaceutical and space industries, manufacturing ambitions, Indian Ocean geography and relationships across the Global South collectively create growing strategic gravity.

The objective therefore moves beyond preventing other powers from limiting India’s choices towards developing the ability to influence the choices available to others.

India should retain strategic autonomy but redefine its purpose. Its diplomacy should remain multi-vector, partnerships issue-based, military modernisation connected to indigenous industrial capacity, technological ambitions linked with national security, and economic diplomacy directed towards durable strategic relationships.

Above all, India must develop the institutional ability to convert its considerable national resources into coordinated geopolitical influence.

The evolution of Indian grand strategy can perhaps be understood through five stages:

Non-Alignment → Strategic Autonomy → Multi-Alignment → Networked Strategic Balancing → Strategic Consequence.

The first four describe how India has navigated an increasingly fragmented international system. The fifth describes where India should aspire to arrive.

The measure of India’s success will therefore not simply be whether New Delhi successfully balances Washington, Beijing and Moscow. It will be whether these powers and the increasingly consequential states of Europe, West Asia and the Indo-Pacific, find it progressively more difficult to construct durable regional and global arrangements without India’s participation.

India should preserve its freedom to balance. But its larger objective must be to acquire sufficient Strategic Gravity that others increasingly have to balance around India.

That is the transition from strategic autonomy to strategic consequence.

Source-1
Lt Gen A.B. Shivane: “US-China-Russia Great Power Rivalry and India’s Balancing Act.”

Source-2
Sumeer Bhasin: West Asia Conflict: Beyond the Myth of US Global Dominance.

Source-3
Sumeer Bhasin: India at the Inflection Point: From Strategic Power to Strategic Consequence.

Sumeer Bhasin

Sumeer Bhasin is a geopolitical analyst and strategic advisor with over three decades of global experience. He writes on South Asia, multipolarity and civilizational statecraft for platforms such as India Foundation’s Chintan, Gateway House, Eurasia Review and Organiser. He has written on the U.S.–Taliban deal, the Af-Pak region, and India’s role in an emerging multipolar order. He also comments actively on X (@sam_bhasin).