Introduction

The Makah Defence Agreement was signed between Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Pakistan on 07 August with a far-reaching clause akin to Article V of the NATO Agreement but within a month of its signing it has been tested.

The Agreement declares that an attack on one member will be treated as an attack on all three. Yet the pact’s ability to deter adversaries or to manage escalation once deterrence fails remains far from assured.

Collective-defence pacts are meant to make war less likely. Yet if signatories make sweeping promises without the military integration, decision-making mechanisms, and escalation controls needed to carry them out, the limits of these promises come under question.

In the absence of clearly established mechanisms for military coordination, crisis consultation, and collective response, the agreement could face serious difficulties in controlling an escalating confrontation. Its strategic significance, therefore, depends less on the declaration of mutual commitment but on whether its members can translate political solidarity into credible and coordinated capabilities for deterrence and escalation management.

Political Solidarity vs Credible Deterrence

Each signatory has differing strategic motivations. Saudi Arabia seeks greater regional leverage and enhanced deterrence to protect its economic transformation and critical national infrastructure. Turkey seeks a cooperative framework to manage regional spillover, counter unfavorable strategic shifts, and align its industrial and military capabilities with those of its partners. Pakistan, the only nuclear power aims to leverage its nuclear and conventional military capabilities   while deepening economic and defence ties with major West Asian countries.

But the central challenge for them lies in converting political solidarity into a sufficiently credible and flexible deterrent without creating commitments that outpace their capacity to act.

The important question, therefore, whether the ambiguity surrounding how these capabilities might be employed together is sufficient to make potential adversaries including Iran, Israel or the Houthi’s less willing to test the resolve of any one member.

A strong political commitment without mechanisms for military coordination may produce little more than symbolic reassurance. Conversely, deeper integration could strengthen deterrence while also creating new escalation risks.

Divergent Priorities

The most important test for any collective security arrangement is the credibility of its members’ commitment to one another. Although all three have emphasised political solidarity in response to growing uncertainty across region, the Makah Agreement remains, largely a political commitment and lacks the military mechanisms necessary for sustained coordination.

The pact is laden with symbolic significance and capacity exists. The three possess military capabilities but they are not complimentary. Saudi Arabia contributes substantial financial muscle, advanced Western-origin air and missile defence systems. Turkey offers a military industrial base manufacturing advanced drones and missile systems and is a part of NATO but is increasingly shifting toward indigenous technologies. Pakistan contributes a large and military largely operating Chinese equipment, significant combat experience, and a nuclear arsenal.

The fact is that defence-industrial cooperation does not automatically produce military interoperability. Building interoperability across these disparate architectures will require years of investment in common communications standards, data links, doctrines and training. If effectively integrated, these capabilities pose the threat of collective retaliation. But this inter-operability and integration is the pact’s most difficult most consequential challenge.

However, threat perceptions and strategic priorities are divergent. Riyadh remains primarily concerned with Gulf Security and the protection of critical infrastructure from and the Houthi’s. While Ankara’s extend across Syria, Iraq, the Eastern Mediterranean to include Cyprus and Greece and the Caucasus. While Islamabad remains heavily focused on India. 

These divergent priorities lead potential adversaries questioning whether all three members would incur the costs and risks necessary to defend one another. No wonder the External Affairs Minister S Jaishankar when asked about India’s reaction to the agreement said; “There are live military situations which each of the signatories face, what has the Makkah pact done in response to that?”

The Gap

In the aftermath of the agreement’s signing, regional actors continued to challenge the security environment: The Houthi’s have attacked Saudi strategic targets including Crude oil tank farms at Jazan and Abha on 08 September, while Israel struck Abu Duhur Air Base near the Turkish border shortly after Turkish security officials had visited the area as part of Ankara’s effort to support the development of Syria’s post-civil-war military capabilities. But none have triggered the recently signed Agreement.

The lightning advance by the Houthi’s along Yemen’s Red Sea Coast that includes Perim Island in the Strait of Bab al-Mandab and Mocha apparently with direct guidance from Iran's Revolutionary Guards has opened a new front in Iran’s war with the US as also brought them direct confrontation with Saudi Arabia.

Houthis hit the cities of Abha, Khamis Mushait, Jazan, and Najran, including Abha International Airport, King Khalid air base, and facilities belonging to state oil giant Aramco. The action can be traced to Mohsen Rezaei, Iran’s Security Chief’s announcement of a “new strategy.” On 02 September he wrote on X “You will soon witness that Iran’s new strategy across the battlefield, diplomacy and countering the economic siege will shatter your foundations.”

On 10 September Pakistan Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Sajjad Haider Khan said that there were no discussions about a military reaction under the Mecca agreement in response to ‌the Houthis; attacks on Saudi Arabia; “There is no such thing under discussion right now ... When time comes (we) will act under the agreement; in response to a question asking how Islamabad planned to fulfil its obligations under the joint defence accord.”

While Defence Minister Khawaja Asif observed that the pact could serve as a deterrent and went on to say that three countries “did not need to respond to aggression with aggression.”

The Makkah Joint Defence Agreement is an umbrella agreement. “Under this agreement, we will have to establish subsequent mechanisms to move forward”; He said the pact was “purely for defensive purposes”; and aimed primarily at strengthening regional peace and stability.

This cautious diplomatic messaging comes against Pakistan’s r effort to maintain close relations with Saudi Arabia while avoiding direct involvement in another regional conflict.

The absence of a coordinated military response from the three partners beyond conventional diplomatic condemnations illustrate the gap between political solidarity and operational deterrence. Unless the pact develops mechanisms for joint planning, intelligence sharing, military exercises, and coordinated responses to aggression, its declaratory commitment may remain insufficient to establish credible collective deterrence.

The signs so far demonstrate a lack of capacity and coordination These early challenges may be an indicator of alliance entrapment and regional polarisation.  Each of these countries has regional issues be it with Yemen, Greece and Cyprus or India. In a case of conflict where other members are forced to choose between the alliance’s credibility and their own economic and geopolitical interests the pact could produce a security dilemma.

There is thus a wide gap between political ambition and military capability.

Conclusion

The gap between the pact’s assertive political language and its publicly specified military commitments remain its central vulnerability. Joint statements can proclaim solidarity in strong terms, but adversaries calibrate their behavior against capabilities and declared red lines, not rhetoric.

Until the pact’s members clarify what its obligations entail it risks being seen not as a deterrent but as an alignment with limited operational substance it. Unless the agreement’s political commitments are matched by credible capabilities and mechanisms for coordination, the Makah Agreement risks overpromising while underdelivering. Such a gap could not only weaken its deterrent value but also complicate crisis management.

No wonder the pact currently appears less like the foundation of a new deterrence architecture and more like a high-stakes political experiment. Its significance should therefore be assessed realistically rather than be viewed by promises it has not been designed to fulfil.

Maj Gen Jagatbir Singh, VSM (Retired)

Major General Jagatbir Singh is an Armoured Corps Officer who commanded the First Armoured Division. He served in varied terrains and tenanted important command, staff and instructional appointments including a UN Peace Keeping Mission in Iraq and Kuwait. He co-authored ‘Armour 1971’ and edited ‘Valour and Honour’.